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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890472-CA 
v. : 
HANS JURGEN DROBEL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of three counts of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978) (amended 1989). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that defendant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived counsel and 
therefore would be allowed to proceed pro se? On appeal, a 
defendant, who expressly declines an offer of counsel by the 
trial court, has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive the right to counsel. State v. Frampton, 737 
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). An appellate court will reverse the 
trial court's ruling on a defendant's request to proceed pro se 
only when that ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, 
e.g., People v. Manaqo, 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 269 Cal.Rptr. 819, 
823 (1990); State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383 (1983) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984). 
2. Did the trial court violate defendant's 
constitutional rights by not allowing him to prepare for trial? 
This issue presents a question of law which is subject to a 
"correction of error" standard of review. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 
(Utah 1989) . 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
defendant credit for time served in pretrial incarceration when 
it sentenced him on the aggravated robbery convictions? Because 
this also presents a question of law, the "correction of error" 
standard of review applies. Christensen, 788 P.2d at 516; 
Willden, 768 P.2d at 456. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In August 1986, defendant, Hans Jurgen Drobel, was 
charged with four counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1986) (amended 
o 
1989) . On February 6, 1987, after a competency evaluation of 
defendant was performed, the trial court ruled that he was not 
competent to stand trial and ordered that he be committed to the 
Utah State Hospital until such time as he was competent to 
proceed (Record Volume identified as Dist. Ct. No. 861912521 as 
o 
part of CR89-89, at 29-30) . On March 16, 1988, the trial court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice the 
charges against defendant, so that a civil commitment of 
3 
defendant could be pursued (^ d. at 34; R. 133 at 2-3; R. 17) . 
On May 11, 1988, the State, having failed to obtain a 
civil commitment of defendant, refiled aggravated Jobbery charges 
(three counts) against defendant (R. 7-8). On October 21, 1988, 
the trial court, after a hearing, ruled that defendant was 
competent to stand trial (R. 133 at 40). On January 27, 1989, at 
his arraignment hearing in district court, defendant requested 
that he be allowed to represent himself (R. 137 at 6). After 
hearing from defendant, defendant's counsel, and the prosecutor, 
the court denied that request (^ d. at 24). However, after a 
subsequent hearing on February 3, 1989, the court granted 
There are five separate record volumes in the record on appeal. 
The original informations charging defendant with the four counts 
of aggravated robbery are contained in the four record volumes 
identified by Dist Ct. No. CR89-89. A fifth record volume 
identified by Dist. Ct. No. 891900089 contains the information 
that charges the three counts of aggravated robbery of which 
defendant was convicted. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references to "R." in this brief are to the latter record volume. 
2 
All other record volumes, except that which is cited to as f,R.H 
in this brief, contain a copy of the court's order. 
3 
The transcripts of the proceedings in this case are marked with 
a record number and therefore will be referred to as "R. 133," 
"R. 132," etc. 
defendant's request to proceed pro se and ordered that 
defendant's counsel up to that point remain as standby counsel 
(R. 130 at 13, 18). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as 
charged (R. 99-101). The court sentenced defendant to 
consecutive five years to life terms at the Utah State Prison on 
all three counts (R. 106). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, the facts of defendant's 
crimes need not be recited. Facts related to the specific issues 
raised by defendant on appeal will be set forth in.the argument 
portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel. The trial court's on-
the-record colloquy with defendant concerning the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation demonstrated that defendant 
understood what he was doing. Furthermore, although perhaps a 
somewhat close question, defendant does not demonstrate that his 
history of mental illness precluded him from competently waiving 
counsel. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court 
violated his constitutional rights by refusing to permit him to 
adequately prepare for trial. Defendant's allegations in this 
regard are conclusory and appear to be premised on an incorrect 
view of what resources are available to an incarcerated defendant 
who elects to proceed pro se. 
-4-
Defendant's request for credit for time spent in 
pretrial incarceration was improperly presented to the trial 
court• That request must be directed to the Board of Pardons. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT 
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed 
reversible error in allowing him to represent himself because the 
court failed to make a sufficient inquiry into whether defendant 
was competent to waive his right to counsel and invoke his right 
to self-representation, and further should have overturned sua 
sponte its ruling once defendant had demonstrated his inability 
"to adequately represent himself and understand what that self-
representation required in connection with procedure in [c]ourt." 
Br. of Appellant at 16-17. In short, he claims that he did not 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel. 
A defendant in a state criminal trial has a fundamental 
constitutional right of self-representation and may defend 
himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently 
elects to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). "It has long 
been settled that the right to the assistance of counsel is 
personal in nature and may be waived by a competent accused if 
the waiver is 'knowingly and intelligently' made[;] [s]uch waiver 
must of course be voluntary." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 
(footnote citations omitted). It is the trial court's duty to 
determine whether the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently made. Ibid. In determining the validity of a 
waiver, the trial court must make the defendant "aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.'" Ibid, (quoting Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 
U.S. 269 (1942)). This information is best obtained through "a 
colloquy on the record between the court and the accused" which 
includes "penetrating questioning" by the court. Ibid. 
In this appeal, defendant, who expressly declined an 
offer of counsel by the trial court, has the burden of 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel. Ibid. "Whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has 
been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding each case." Ld. at 188 (footnote citations omitted). 
Although no Utah appellate court decision has expressly stated 
so, it is generally recognized that a trial court's ruling on a 
defendant's request to proceed pro se will not be reversed unless 
that ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
People v. Manaqo, 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 269 Cal.Rptr. 819, 823 
(1990) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to proceed pro se); Halbert v. State, 735 P.2d 
565, 566 (Okl. Cr. 1987) (abuse of discretion standard applied); 
State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383, 391 (1983) (en 
banc) (same), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984). 
-G-
Defendant first moved to represent himself at his 
arraignment in the district court. Although he indicated that he 
was satisfied "so far" with his counsel, Manny Garcia, he wished 
to represent himself (R. 137 at 3, 6-8). As defendant fully 
discusses in his brief, the court, after questioning defendant on 
his request and considering the concerns of both defense counsel 
and the prosecutor that defendant was not competent to represent 
himself due to a perceived mental disorder, denied defendant's 
request for self-representation (R. 137 at 24). It stated: 
Based upon the court's grave concerns as to 
the magnitude of the offenses that are 
charged against you, Mr. Drobel, and based 
upon the representation of your attorney, Mr. 
Garcia, and the concern of the State and the 
apparent lengthy history of mental concerns 
that have been expressed to the court today 
and are partially contained in the file, the 
court finds that it is not in your best 
interests to have you represent yourself and 
denies your motion and request to represent 
yourself. 
(R. 137 at 24). However, in a subsequent hearing one week later, 
the court again considered defendant's request that he be allowed 
to represent himself. The following colloquy between the court 
and defendant occurred: 
The Court: Mr. Drobel, the court has placed 
this matter on the court's calendar for the 
opportunity to review and, perhaps, 
reconsider the question of your request 
previously to represent yourself before this 
court in trial. Is it still your desire to 
represent yourself? 
Defendant: It is, Your Honor. 
The Court: Do you understand that the 
Constitution does protect your right to do 
that[;] however, the court does not recommend 
that? 
Defendant: I understand that, yes. 
The Court: Do you also understand that there 
are certain dangers that are incorporated by 
representing yourself before this court in a 
trial and this is anticipated, as I recall, 
to be a jury trial. 
Is that correct Mr. Garcia? 
Mr. Garcia: Yes, Your Honor. 
The Court: There are dangers and risks that 
can occur by doing that. Do you understand 
that? 
Defendant: I understand your point. 
The Court: Do you understand that you are 
charged with three first-degree felonies, 
each being armed robberies, as I recall the 
counts of the information? 
Defendant: I acknowledge that, yeah. 
The Court: And do you also understand a 
first-degree felony may result, if you are 
convicted, in a penalty of five to life at 
the Utah State Prison on each offense and 
that the penalty may be imposed to run 
consecutively or concurrently and you may be 
thus housed in the Utah State Prison? 
Defendant: I heard about that. 
The Court: You don't have any questions 
about that, do you? 
Defendant: No question, no. 
The Court: You've read the information that 
has been alleged against you, that is the 
document on which the charges are contained, 
and you understand that's the penalty that 
could be imposed upon you if you are 
convicted? 
Defendant: I understand that. 
The Court: Now, Mr. Drobel, there has been a 
history of questionable mental health. You 
understand that your attorney, Mr. Garcia, 
desires to raise the defense to this action 
of diminished capacity mentally ill. You 
also understand that since these offenses 
occurred, as I recall—I don't have the 
specific date but they are 1985 offenses— 
Mr. Garcia: '86, I believe. 
The Court: '86 offenses. That for a period 
of time thereafter you were housed at the 
Utah State Hospital with physicians having 
determined that at the beginning of that 
period of time you were incompetent to 
continue in assisting in the defense of your 
matter and that you were not competent to 
stand trial. Do you understand that? 
Defendant: So far. 
The Court: Do you understand that after you 
had been retained in the Utah State Hospital 
for a period of approximately a year those 
same physicians determined that your mental 
health was likely malingering or a result of 
your desire to continue it, in that respect, 
and they determined that you were thus no 
longer in need of protection for mental 
health difficulties. 
Defendant: I read the report, yes. 
The Court: All right. You don't have any 
trouble understanding that report? 
Defendant: No problems. 
The Court: And you obviously disagree with 
the earlier statement that you had mental 
difficulties and now you certainly do not 
claim that you have continuing mental defects 
or difficulty; is that correct? 
Defendant: I have never said that I was 
mentally ill. 
The Court: And you don't claim that now, do 
you? 
Defendant: Claim to be mentally ill? 
The Court: Yes. 
Defendant: I don't claim to be mentally ill. 
The Court: You claim, in fact, to be not 
mentally ill, don't you? 
Defendant: Correct. 
The Court: You understand that if the court 
allows you to defend yourself that your 
defense that Mr. Garcia recommends will not 
be raised, that is, he wanted to defend on 
the basis that you do have mental difficulty 
and diminished capacity but you feel that's 
not appropriate to present to the jury? 
Defendant: Would you say that again. 
The Court: Sure. Mr. Garcia believes the 
defense, among others that should be raised 
to the jury, is that you do have mental 
difficulty. 
Defendant: Oh, yeah, he told me so, yeah. 
The Court: All right. You do not believe 
you do and you do not desire that defense to 
be presented; is that correct? 
Defendant: That's correct. 
The Court: You understand then that if the 
case is tried to the jury with you 
representing yourself and defending yourself 
that that defense will not be presented? 
That mental difficulty? 
Defendant: If I defend myself that 
recommendation of Mr. Garcia's will not be 
used. That's correct. 
The Court: You understand that. 
Defendant: I do understand that, yes. 
The Court: Now, you understand also—you 
indicated to the court last week when you 
were here that there were certain, if I 
recall the word, "creative defenses" that you 
think you could raise to the jury that Mr. 
Garcia would not raise to the jury because 
he's a lawyer trained in the law and you were 
a businessman. Is that correct? 
Defendant: That is not correct. 
The Court: All right. Tell me what you 
anticipate raising—you don't need to 
disclose to me your defenses, but your desire 
is to defend your case yourself in this case 
-i n_ 
without Mr. Garcia except as he may sit at 
counsel table and give you advice; is that 
correct? 
Defendant: So far that's correct. 
The Court: Well, do you anticipate changing 
your mind? 
Defendant: Oh, no, but I agree to what you 
said, Your Honor, that I'm not going to 
disclose at this time the strategy of my 
defense. 
The Court: I'm not asking you to. 
Defendant: Yeah. Neither did I use, as far 
as I remember, that quotation, "creative 
defense." I think I—I don't think I used 
that word. 
The Court: What did you use, if you recall? 
Defendant: I didn't use any word regarding 
my defense. I just was stating that—excuse 
me for repeating this—lawyers sometimes lack 
imagination in their defense. 
The Court: All right. So that "imagination" 
maybe was the adjective that you used last 
week. And their lack of imagination you 
believe you can defend your case better with 
your imagination, right [sic]? 
Defendant: Imagination alone doesn't do it. 
Experience and knowledge and assistance from 
as many sides as possible combined will do 
it. 
The Court: And you believe you can defend 
yourself with those combined skills? 
Defendant: Oh, yes, definitely. 
The Court: Tell me what your education is. 
Defendant: I told you last time. 
The Court: I know you said 24 years. I want 
you to tell me again. 
Defendant: What do you want to hear? 




What kind of? 
Just describe your education. 
Defendant: I was trained mainly in business 
and that included advertisement—what's the 
word in English? 






Yes, I have. 
How many of those. 
22. 
Last week you said 24. 
Defendant: I said 24f yeah. I had two years 
in addition which were not done by a public 
university but with an institute. I think I 






No. Correspondent college. 
All right. 
Defendant: Well, in Germany correspondent 
colleges are accepted as well as university 
so, therefore, I said last time 24 but I 
heard this is maybe different here in the 
United States. 
The Court: All right. Your native tongue is 
German; is that correct? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: But it's obvious to the court 
that you speak fluent English. Do you feel 
that you have any language difficencies [sic] 
in understanding English and in defending 
yourself in English? 
Defendant: Yes, I have. I would ask at the 
proper time to provide me with a couple of 
translators. 
-1 0_ 
The Court: What English training have you 
had? 
Defendant: In Germany it is the law to learn 
English in school but that is just merely 
some English, what we call school English, 
and that is based on the British language, 
but then I have contact with Americans we 
have doing business in Europe. And then I 
came over here seven years ago and I learned, 
of course, by experience, being in the 
country more. But still I feel that I lack 
many, you know, terms, especially in the 
court. I have to learn about them and for 
this this is one of the reasons I would like 
to have an attorney on my side that would 
stand by— 
The Court: All right. Do you understand 
that there are dangers in defending yourself? 
Defendant: You said so, yeah. 
The Court: Do you understand that the rules 
of evidence involve training that you may not 
have? 
Defendant: A possibility but that's not— 
that is not necessarily true or a fact. 
The Court: All right. Do you understand 
that you have the right to be confronted by 
witnesses and the trial procedure would be 
the State would call witnesses to testify 
against you and you would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses? 
Defendant: I understand that, Your Honor. 
The Court: Do you understand that normal 
legal objections such as objections to 
relevance, objections if the hearsay rules 
are deemed being violated, objections if the 
nature of the questioning is argumentative 
and other such legal objections would be 
raised by the State during the course of the 
trial and the court would have to rule on 
those as matters of law? Do you understand 
that? 
Defendant: Yeah, I understand that and I'm 
prepared by that. 
The Court: And you are prepared to raise 
those objections, you believe? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Do you understand that you may 
compel witnesses to testify on your own 
behalf and that you have indicated to this 
court that you believe some approximate [sic] 
22 witnesses should be called to testify but 
that this court would be obligated to rule on 
whether those witness's [sic] testimony would 
be relevant to the case? Do you understand 
that? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: And that you don't just call 
witnesses just to testify to your character 
and credibility, you call witnesses to 
testify to facts that they are aware of in 
relation to the offense. Do you understand 
that? 
Defendant: Yes. Yes, I do. 
The Court: Is anyone putting any pressure or 
undue influence on you for the purpose of 
having you request this representation by 
yourself? 
Defendant: No, sir. 
The Court: You are doing this as a voluntary 
act? 
Defendant: I do. 
(R. 130 at 3-12). The court then granted defendant's request for 
self-representation and ordered that Mr. Garcia remain on the 
4 
case as standby counsel (Id. at 13, 18). 
4 
Although defendant suggests that he did not trust Mr. Garcia to 
assist him as standby counsel and thus the trial court erred in 
retaining him as such, Br. of Appellant at 16 n.16, he clearly 
had no objection to Garcia remaining and, in fact, appeared to 
desire very much Garcia's assistance in preparing for trial. In 
discussing with the court a possible continuance of the trial 
date to allow defendant more time to prepare, defendant said: 
Yes, I think [a February 23] trial date 
Although the court's inquiry regarding self-
representation did not precisely follow that suggested by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12, it 
satisfied the general requirement that the trial court Minsure[] 
that [a] defendantf] understand[s] the risks of self-
representation, " id. at 187. The colloquy between the court and 
defendant demonstrates that defendant "'understood the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of self-representation[,] . . . 
understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible 
maximum penaltyf,] . . . [and] was aware of the existence of 
technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a 
matter of telling one's story. '" Ijd. at 188 (quoting City of 
Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wash.2d 203, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en 
banc)). Additionally, the court made clear to defendant that it 
did not recommend self-representation. See State v. Ruple, 631 
P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1981) (trial court failed to advise the 
defendant that "it is generally advisable to have a lawyer who is 
skilled and trained in law"). 
Defendant argues that the court's inquiry was 
inadequate because it did not sufficiently explore defendant's 
mental problems and their effect on his ability to knowingly and 
intelligently waive counsel. Specifically, he claims that 
nothing in the record indicates the competency file offered by 
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Cont. could be done depending on Mr. 
Garcia's calendar because I think I would 
like to take quite a bit of time from him and 
so maybe we should ask him how much time he's 
able to spend with me or my case. 
(R. 130 at 16). 
Mr. Garcia at the arraignment hearing was "formally or 
informally" reviewed by the court, and that the court should have 
ordered the scheduled examination of defendant for a possible 
diminished capacity defense even though defendant had indicated 
he did not want to pursue that defense. In short, defendant 
asserts that the court, in granting his request to proceed pro se 
at the February 3 hearing, effectively ignored his history of 
mental illness and the prior representations of counsel and the 
doctors on that subject. However, the record simply does not 
support such a conclusion. 
At defendant's arraignment hearing on January 27, Mr. 
Garcia presented to the court a detailed summary of the history 
of defendant's case and the diagnoses of the doctors who had 
examined defendant and concluded that he was mentally ill (R. 137 
at 11-14). Mr. Garcia forcefully argued that, based on the 
doctors' conclusions, defendant should not be allowed to 
represent himself (R. 137 at 14-15). The court obviously 
considered all of this when, at the end of that hearing, it 
denied defendant's request to proceed pro se. Although the court 
subsequently granted the request at the February 3 hearing, 
defendant cannot fairly state that the court had not considered 
defendant's history of mental illness and the representations of 
the doctors and counsel. Indeed, during its questioning of 
defendant at that hearing, the court specifically discussed with 
defendant his history of mental illness and his desire to forgo a 
diminished capacity defense (R. 130 at 4-7). In sum, while 
defendant may now disagree with the court's ruling on self-
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representation, the court clearly considered defendant's mental 
5 
condition before making that ruling . 
A more difficult question is presented as to whether 
defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 
that, under the particular circumstances of his case, he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. This he 
must do to show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing him to proceed pro se. 
While defendant was found competent to stand trial, 
that finding alone did not automatically enable him to waive the 
constitutional right to counsel and to conduct his own defense. 
State v. Laffertyf 749 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1988). However, as 
acknowledged by defendant, the "standard of competence for making 
the decision to represent oneself is vaguely higher than the 
standard for competence to stand trial." United States ex rel. 
Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. 
Wertheimer, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 930, 472 N.E.2d 266, 268 (1984) 
(collecting cases). "Accordingly, trial courts hesitate to deny 
the request [for self-representation] of an adult defendant 
unless he appears to be suffering from some significant mental 
Defendant does not explain how the scheduled examination of 
defendant for the possible diminished capacity defense would have 
added any useful information to the record regarding defendant's 
mental condition. That defendant suffered from a mental disorder 
generally described by the doctors as a "delusional disorder of 
the grandiose type" (R. 133 at 9; R. 136 — Letters of Breck 
Lebegue, M.D. (dated Dec. 1, 1988) and of Van 0. Austin and 
Robert J. Howell, M.D. (dated Sept. 20, 1988)), was well 
documented and fully presented to the court by defendant's 
counsel at the arraignment hearing (R. 137 at 12-14). 
disability. Where the record suggests such a possibility and the 
trial court made an appropriate inquiry, its determination that a 
defendant was competent, notwithstanding some history of mental 
illness, is likely to be sustained on appeal. The trial judge . 
. . is 'in the best position to observe the defendant, his 
conduct and his demeanor.'" LaFave and Israel, Criminal 
Procedure § 11.5(d) at 48-49 (1984) (footnotes omitted). 
In the instant case, the trial court was presented with 
a difficult situation. Defendant, who clearly had a history of 
mental illness, insisted upon representing himself. When the 
court discussed the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation with him, defendant appeared to understand what he 
was doing. The court thoroughly questioned defendant about his 
education, which was fairly extensive. Although the court may 
have validly refused to allow defendant to proceed pro se under 
the circumstances, its decision to permit him to represent 
himself was not an abuse of discretion. See People v. Clark, 50 
Cal.3d 583, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, 149-50 (1990) (trial 
court did not err in ruling that the defendant was competent to 
represent himself at penalty phase of capital case, even though 
defendant had history of mental illness and had engaged in self-
destructive behavior); State v. Harding, 670 P.2d at 391 (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant 
was mentally competent to waive counsel where in making its 
determination, the court considered psychiatrists' opinions and 
also observed defendant's demeanor and heard responses to 
inquiries about procedural matters posed by court, and where 
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record reflected that defendant was articulate and forcefully 
expressed his desire to represent himself). Based on the entire 
record, and particularly the on-the-record discussion between the 
court and defendant, the court was well within its discretion in 
concluding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived counsel. "[M]ere diagnosis of a mental 
disease or disorder does not mean that the defendant is unable to 
make rational decisions regarding his case." Harding, 670 P.2d 
at 391 (citations omitted). And, this is not a case where the 
trial court failed to adequately advise the defendant of the 
dangers of self-representation, see Ruple, 631 P.2d at 876, or 
where the defendant did not clearly assert his right to self-
representation, see Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1248. 
Finally, that defendant did not make certain motions 
(e.g., motion to sever, motion to suppress ), filed a motion to 
dismiss which lacked legal merit, and conducted a quiet defense 
which did not include a diminished capacity defense, did not 
require the court to reverse sua sponte its ruling that defendant 
could proceed pro se. A defendant is not bound by the 
recommendations of counsel as to particular defenses, and may 
make decisions that are detrimental to his case. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d at 1249. Additionally, defendant, who chose to proceed pro 
se, may not allege on appeal that he did not adequately represent 
himself by failing to file certain motions, etc. See Frampton, 
737 P.2d at 189. 
Defendant does not claim that he would have prevailed on any of 
these motions. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY 
REFUSING TO PERMIT HIM TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE 
FOR TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his 
constitutional rights because it did not allow him to adequately 
prepare for trial. Specifically, he claims, as he did in his 
motion to dismiss (R. 60), that he was denied access to an 
adequate law library, was not allowed to use effectively the 
telephone, and did not have adequate contact with standby counsel 
or the prosecutor. As in his motion to dismiss, these 
allegations are presented in conclusory fashion without any 
description of what information he was denied that he needed for 
trial preparation. Furthermore, defendant never requested 
additional time to prepare for trial and did not seek any 
specific remedies (other than dismissal) for the alleged 
problems. Although defendant claims to have had inadequate 
contact with standby counsel, his motion to dismiss plainly 
indicates that Mr. Garcia was available to help him and to 
provide necessary case law to the court (R. 60-61). Thus, this 
case is distinguishable from Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443 (9th 
Cir. 1985), which is relied on by defendant. Indeed, the better 
view is that a defendant who voluntarily waives his right to 
counsel is not entitled to access to a law library, so long as he 
is afforded some alternative means for assistance in the 
preparation of his defense, such as standby counsel. United 
States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 
521 (1990); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226 
(7th Cir. 1983); LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(e) at 
51 (1984) ("While the pro se defendant who is incarcerated may 
have a right of access to legal materials (within limits), he 
will not be heard to complain on appeal that his ignorance of 
various procedural requirements should be excused because the 
prison's law library was inadequate (particularly where standby 
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counsel was available)."). 
In sum, defendant simply has not demonstrated that the 
trial court restricted his efforts to prepare for trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT CREDIT FOR PRETRIAL INCARCERATION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his 
right to equal protection by not granting him credit toward his 
prison sentence for the time he spent at the Utah State Prison. 
This argument is without merit. The Utah Supreme Court has made 
clear that, in felony cases where an indeterminate sentence is 
imposed, the trial court does not have authority to grant credit 
for pretrial incarceration; that request must be directed to the 
Board of Pardons. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 276-77 
(Utah 1985). 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not 
appointing an interpreter. Although defendant did request an 
interpreter and the court did not rule on that request, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that he did not fully 
understand the proceedings and what was being said. While he 
indicated that he did not understand some legal terms, defendant 
appeared to understand the English language very well. In fact, 
at one point, the court commented, "[I]t's obvious to the court 
that you speak fluent English" (R. 130 at 10). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions and sentences should be affirmed. 
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